This paper examines from a policy perspective nuclear energy policy in the United States (US) from 1990 to 2010 and questions whether it is or has become a Federal or State responsibility. The present study, as befits policy research, engages with many disciplines (for example, in particular, law and politics) and hence the contributions move beyond that of nuclear energy policy literature and in particular to that on nuclear new build and other assessments of large infrastructure projects. Several examples at the Federal level are identified that demonstrate that the nuclear industry has evolved to a stage where it requires a focus on the power of actions at a more localised (state) level in order to re-ignite the industry. The research concludes that there remains a misunderstanding of the issue of project management for complex construction projects, and it is highly arguable whether many of its issues have been resolved. Further, the research asserts that the economics of nuclear energy are not the most influential reason for no nuclear new build in the US. >
1: Introduction
This paper examines from a policy perspective nuclear energy policy in the United States (US) from 1990 to 2010 and questions whether it is or has become a Federal or State responsibility. This paper seeks to identify and clarify those aspects of the legal, economic, and political requirements of the United States (US) in the nuclear energy sector and in particular those which affect prospects for nuclear new build but which, so far, have not been well understood by experts. The nuclear energy industry has a structure that is led by policies and institutions at a Federal (national) and even international level. This research demonstrates through several examples at a Federal level that the nuclear industry has evolved to a stage where it now requires a focus on the power of actions at a more localised (state) level in order to re-ignite the industry.
hrough the exploration of policy inaction at Federal level, state policy emerges as a key river i T d n encouraging the growth and operation of the nuclear energy industry.
The present study, as befits policy research, engages with many disciplines (for example, in particular, law and politics). Hence, contributions are made not only at an academic policy level, but also in identifying misunderstood conceptions of public administration, as well as project management, and legal structure issues that exist for the planning of large infrastructure in the US through a focus on the nuclear energy industry but with a particular focus on nuclear new build and long-term waste management.
Finally, the research contributes to the nuclear energy policy literature and in particular to that on nuclear new build. In this regard, guiding this research are other indepth examinations of nuclear energy policy (see , Jasper 1990; Hecht, 2008; Pope, 2009 ) and other assessments of large infrastructure projects (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003; Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003 ; American Planning Association, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2011). The 59 interviews used here have been carried out across the USA. While the focus is placed on nuclear energy policy in the USA from 1990 to 2010, it does factor in the release of a few publications relevant to the nuclear sector after 2010. However, the effect of the nuclear energy incident at Fukushima, Japan, in 2011 is beyond the scope of this research.
2: A Brief Background to the US Electr d Nuclear Industries
Civilian nuclear energy accounts for 22 percent of the total electricity supply in the US (see Table 1 below). There are 104 nuclear reactors across the US, representing a quarter of the total number of nuclear reactors in the world. The nuclear power industry in the US grew to its present capacity primarily through the construction programmes initiated during the 1960s and 1970s.
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Renewable energy is playing a growing role in the US electricity market. Renewable energy sources are projected to have the strongest growth over the medium term due to Federal and State level programs -such as the Federal Renewable Fuels Standard (RFS) and the various State Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) programs, nd the rise in fossil fuel prices. In some projections renewables will account for 45 ercent of the increase in total generation from 2008 to 2035 (EIA, 2010a). a p Nevertheless, despite many reactor closures (23 reactors have been permanently shut down -NRC, 2011) and no new nuclear build, nuclear energy has maintained its osition in the US electricity market in the period 1990-2010 due to the better tilisation of generating capacity, uprates and life extensions see Table 2 . p u 
Total Reactors in the US
Reactors are located at 65 sites (plants) in the US with the majority of plants located in the eastern half of the country in 33 states as Figure A demonstrates. 69 of the reactors in operation are pressurised water reactors, and 35 are boiling water reactors. Figure A locates the current reactors in operation and also identifies how long the reactors have been in operation. Evident is that there are no new reactors in the 0-9 year category in the US. 
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The Major Legislation in the Civil Nuclear Energy Sector in the US
The centrepiece of nuclear legislation in the US is the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 USC 2011 et seq.] which is a comprehensive Federal statute that regulates possession and use of radioactive material and facilities that produce or use such material. There are also several other statutes that cover more specific aspects of the regulation of adioactive material and facilities, for example, in radiological protection, radiological aste m clear security. r w anagement, non-proliferation, exports and nu
The key laws in the nuclear energy sector are: as S.170 and has been revised several times, and more recently so by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. The purpose of the act is to provide a Federal compensation fund of $10 billion should there be a nuclear accident. The Act does limit liability and does not guarantee payment should possible funds be exhausted already.
• Energy Reorganisation Act of 1974 -The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was s e t i EPRG 1301
• Department of Energy Organisation Act of 1977 -This combined several government energy agencies together to form the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE then became responsible for the development and production of nuclear weapons, the promotion of nuclear energy and other energy related work.
• Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982 -This aimed to provide for the development of repositories for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. Its other main aims were to establish a program of research, development, and demonstration regarding the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel.
• The Energy Policy Act of 2005 -This encourages the development of specifically nuclear power, with several forms of incentives introduced. These take the form of loan guarantees, carbon free production tax credits, protection tax credits, and a new form of risk insurance for the first 6 reactors. The aim of the legislation is to move the US towards a national goal of energy independence with the aid of nuclear power. It also continued the Price-Anderson Act.
3: Methodology
The research methodology used here is contrast explanation. At its core is dialectical learning that has a three step process whereby the researcher: (1) explores the research topic in depth; (2) enters the field and conducts the research; and finally (3) revises what was learnt at the first step (Lawson, 2009 ). Contrast explanation occurs at step 2, and involves the testing of hypotheses created in step 1. These research hypotheses are debated with the interviewees who state whether they are proponents or critics of the hypothesis. The research method is useful where an affirmative or negative policy action occurs -i.e. a nuclear power plant is to be built or it is not. The results are then presented visually on a graph demonstrating which hypotheses are contested and thus worthy of further analysis. Only hypotheses that are contested by interviewees to a sufficient degree (where there is no 75 percent majority of interviewees in favour or against) are further analysed. Hence a majority is needed and the majority figure of 75 per cent is chosen. In civil court trials a verdict can be reached with 10 out of 12 jurors in agreement or 9 out of ten (s.17, Juries Act 1974). The threshold of 75 per cent chosen here is to reflect that but is adjusted so as not to be as severe since these are policy related decisions that are under analysis rather that actual court proceedings but nevertheless the aim is to secure a high majority who are in favour of/against the policy action. The method aims to achieve a consensus view and the results are based on the experts' (those interviewed) knowledge and understanding of the policy and legislative issues. Similar to the aforementioned Expert Elicitation methodology of the US EPA the contributions of this research can be thought of as: (1) a description of the state of nowledge, and what we know and do not know; (2) a process by which we obtain etter n e n 3 k b 4 informatio (to r duce primarily uncertai ty); and ( ) both the latter improve understanding of existing observations (US EPA Expert Elicitation Task Force White Paper, 2011: 28).
Then the stage three analysis begins, and this determines whether the hypothesis is proven or unproven. This decision is based on in depth interview analyses (coded and managed through using Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software), analysis tical; and what the impact of these prevailing emphases is on the actual practices of social scientists and the communities they study and serve" (Moss, 1998:56) . o f f policy actions and documents (including those suggested by interviewees), and urther literature review. Lessons from the analysis of each contested hypothesis emerge and are stated at the end.
Contrast methodology is used in a variety of forms across many disciplines in the social sciences and humanities: in philosophy (political - Carlson, 1990) (Pinkstone, 2002; Lawson, 1997; . The method is similar to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) methodology of Expert Elicitation (see US EPA Expert Elicitation Task Force White Paper, 2011) however it is noted in the White Paper (pg. 68) that Expert Elicitation is a financially expensive methodology, and hence contrast explanation is more suitable for a single researcher. An earlier form of the methodology employed here is also used by Heffron 2012a) who examined progress in nuclear energy policy in Romania, while the ethod ( m ology is also based on that used by Heffron (2012b Heffron ( : 2012c to examine nuclear energy policy in three US states.
However, at its core is always dialectical learning which has existed as a method for learning since Socrates and Plato introduced it in its initial form (Lawson, 2009 deliberating, Further at the core of the COOL project were stakeholder interviews similar to the interviews conducted for this research.
Contrast explanation has been employed in many other areas too: such as in corporate strategic planning (Mason, 1969; Mitroff 1971; Mason and Mitroff, 1981 ) for complex problems -where problems/issues are drawn from current understandings and then examined from previous or potential outcomes. This is similar to this study, as nuclear energy policy is noted as a complex subject matter (Breyer, 1978; MacKerron, 2004) . Mitroff and Mason (1981) have argued that the policy and planning field is beyond the scope of traditional scientific experimentation. For example, Corbey (1995) used dialectal learning for analysis of EU policy where he assessed the various phases and process in the development and integration of the EU. Similarly this research examines the processes behind the development of nuclear new build. The central issue for contrast explanation is not really about what is possible within different perspectives but rather as Bernstein (1979) Interviews form the essence of primary data for this research. Stakeholders in the nuclear energy sector were identified following that outlined in Table 3 below. This follows other efforts of researchers who identify stakeholders prior to conducting their analysis. For example, Jasper (1990) too conducted a similar study to this research with over 100 stakeholder interviews in examining nuclear energy policy. However, his focus was on three countries (the US, France, and Sweden) from the point of the 1970s oil risis to circa 1990. He conducted 100 interviews with managers, policymakers and ctivists in the three countries. The focus of the work was exclusively on political and conomic structures to account for public policy decision making for the nuclear energy c a e sector. 
4: Research Hypothesis
The research question is directed towards how Federal level policy can impact upon state level policy in the US. In essence, it examines the operation of Federal law and policy and deliberates on the consequence effect for state policy. The case of nuclear nergy is used as an example. The research also identifies several characteristics of an ndustr e i y -where large infrastructure development is at the core -to improve and renew the industry so as to create more favourable conditions for further investment and growth.
The methodology of contrast explanation, which is applied in this research, has particular advantages. It is emergent, in the sense that it acknowledges that the researcher will acquire knowledge throughout each research phase and this can be incorporated into the research -in the form of the emergent hypotheses being examined. The research offers in-depth insight and policy development analysis of the contested hypotheses and advances a methodology to further knowledge on a complex EPRG 1301 policy issue. It is adversarial and incremental in its approach. The developed hypotheses that w re uncontested are conclusions to the research themselves and these are e discussed in brief before the analysis of the contested hypotheses. After the literature review had been conducted, 11 research hypotheses were developed (see Table 4 below and Appendix A) and tested in the interview process.
Only three of the eleven hypotheses qualified for further analysis under the d these are specified below in Table 4 . research methodology an 
H2
Federal laws favour the development of the nuclear energy sector
CH1
H3
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is too slow in its approval of licensing for a new nuclear plant
Accepted (UH)
H4
The slow construction times of the previous nuclear new build still have a negative impact Accepted (UH)
H5
Nuclear operating companies do not have the financial capacity to build a nuclear new build project
Accepted (UH)
H6
Nuclear energy is an example of the failure to deli large construction project in the ver a dget
CH2
US on time and on bu
H7
Nuclear lobby groups are weak in comparison to environmental lobbying groups
Accepted (UH)
H8
Environmental lobbying groups no longer see nuclear energy as the primary opposition
Accepted (UH)
H9
The unattractive economics of nuclear energy are the major reason the US nuclear industry has slowed down
CH3
H10
Information dissemination about nuclear energy is not sufficient
Accepted (UH)
H11 n nuclear energy issues and education of the next generation of staff for the sector are weaknesses in the sector
Education o
Discussion of Uncontested Hypotheses
Nuclear energy in the US has significant competition as an electricity supply source, however, not just from coal and gas, but increasingly from renewable energy (wind in particular). Indeed, there is too much competition by other energy sources to enable nuclear energy expansion in many US states at present (H1). Further, the potential of shale gas in the US (for example, in Pennsylvania with the discovery of the Marcellus Shale gas reserves) is adding to the competition. Nevertheless, some nterviewees expressed that nuclear energy is still needed, for example one interviewee 2P) st i ( There are other factors which have played a role in nuclear energy development in the US, in particular, the regulator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
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NRC ha has un s struggled in the past in taking a long time to approve projects, and although it dergone changes, there remains a need to improve (H3):
"What impressed me about the NRC was their ability to make good technical decisions and that they made decisions. I was concerned before I went there. The fact that, you know, we had all heard that there had not been a new reactor license application since Three Mile Island. There were a lot of licenses in process but there had not been a new one. So I was concerned about the NRC's ability to make decisions but it turned out that d that was an unfounded concern because they had one power upgrades, they had done license renewals so I was impressed with the agency. I thought they were a good focused organisation but like any organisation you can do much better" (3B).
Electricity policy suffers from fragmentation in the US with each state having significant control of their own electricity policy -except for those in regional electricity markets, for example PJM. This fragmentation led to an element of individuality with the technical design of nuclear power plants and when coupled with the slow regulatory regime contributed to slow construction times in the past (H4). Further, the ragmentation resulted in the weakness in the financial capacity of energy companies in he US f t to build a new nuclear project (H5) with companies operating within states and not having without major public funds access to the financial resources needed to build a nuclear power project.
Nuclear energy lobby groups are weak in comparison to environmental lobbying groups (H7). For many years during the 1960s, nuclear had no need for lobbying because of the link between nuclear energy, the military and politics. As a result lobby groups, lobby formations and networks do not as readily exist or are at a later stage of development than lobby groups, networks and associations for other energy sources. A positive issue related to this is that environmental lobbying groups no longer see nuclear energy as the primary opposition (H8). This because of the association of nuc ear l energy with clean energy sources in that it produces no carbon dioxide. Indeed, many environmental lobby groups are transferring their efforts to tackle carbon dioxide producing energy sources.
Information dissemination about nuclear energy is not sufficient in the US (H10). This is linked intrinsically to the problem of education on and surrounding nuclear energy issues. Nuclear energy is a complex subject and topic -there is an educational gap surrounding the subject area (H11). Indeed many of those interviewed expressed the view that employees across energy and nuclear energy institutions not to mention the public do not understand all the issues involved. They state that there is a shortage of current and prospective employees who can envisage the holistic picture of nuclear energy, and as a result decision-making from organisations in the nuclear energy decision-making sectors lack holistic decision-making ability; therefore decisionmaking on nuclear energy matters suffers from a piecemeal or fragmented approach, i.e.
here a decision is made regarding a particular part of nuclear energy policy or egulation. 
5.1: Contested Hypothesis 1 (CH1) Federal Laws favour the Development of the Nuclear Energy Sector
The judgement of interviewees is assessed in Chart 1 below. This chart analyses whether interviewees were proponents (positive) or critics (negative) of the researcher's hypothesis. For a hypothesis to be further analysed, the hypothesis must be a 'contested' hypothesis, which is where there is less than a majority of 75 percent of respondents either for or against. If it is more than 75 percent then it will not be considered contested and thus not further analysed, with this decision being based on the overall response of respondents. The blue line (see Chart 1) indicates the 75 percent threshold. The number 0 represents the hypothesis decision line -for or against.
Intervie d
wee responses (where total n=59) are recalculated to represent a value of 100 percent. On the chart, the overall respon ent result is given first followed by each stakeholder category of interviewees.
Whether a contested hypothesis is proven or unproven is achieved by further analysis that follows (previously referred to as the stage three analysis in dialectical learning), conducted on the interviewee data (through the use of Atlas.ti software), the analysis of legal and policy actions and documents in the US, and updating the literature eview through documents recommended and given by interviewees. Further, tatements in the analysis that follows are supported by the critics or proponents of the ypothesis and in these cases the reference code is CVP which is the consensus view of roponents, an r s h p d CVC consensus view of the critics. Table 5 below shows that incentives were given to all energy sectors. Gas, and oil received subsidies of various types, and in particular the permit process was shortened to deliver quicker supplies of oil and gas (s. 265, s.366). Renewables and coal (CCS technology) also received a subsidy through the form of the loan guarantee system. Further, CCS technology also received further subsidies through The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Pu. L. No. 115-5). Despite the loan guarantee system having been established under the 2005 Act for all clean energy sources (non-carbon dioxide emitting electricity sources), the same negative publicity received by the nuclear sector regarding the loan system has not been received by the renewable energy and coal CCS technology industries (CVC). n=59, nElected Politicians=9, nPublic Sector=19, nPrivate Sector=9, nAcademic Researchers=15, nNGOs=7 From Chart 1 it is evident that the hypothesis is near evenly contested. There is a minor majority against the hypothesis. The view expressed by the hypothesis proponents was that it was at the Federal level that nuclear energy should be incentivised (CVP). There was also the belief that it was not within a state's function, or remit, to be incentivising new energy infrastructure (CVP). Nevertheless, actions within number of states demonstrate that there is the capability to incentivise or encourage ew nu r a n clea power plants. The research analysis that follows demonstrates the inaction at Federal level and the effect on state policy, and hence the contested hypothesis (CH1) is unproven.
The main reason for the hypothesis not been proven is four-fold. First, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was meant to re-ignite the industry, and has so far failed to have a significant influence (CVC). Second, critics of the hypothesis argue that there is a misconception or at least an incorrect interpretation that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was created to benefit nuclear (CVC). Third, while the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) has improved as an institution it has achieved this improvement from a ery low base (CVP). Finally, at a federal level in nuclear energy issues there is a general tate of policy inaction.
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The Misconception of who benefits from the Energy Policy Act of 2005
The recent law, the Energy Policy of Act 2005 (hereafter also referred to as the '2005 Act') has been significant for nuclear energy in terms of the incentives it has offered but has not yet delivered any for nuclear new build. Indeed, only one state, Georgia has to benefitted from the loan guarantees system. Permitting process for oil and gas was streamlined and this c ts out years and months of delays in a western states pilot program -it will brin ew il to the market sooner. S. 366 e en states it is possi le for a permit o drill t be issued within 30 days -though this is for a pilot project across western states only. Source: Compiled by the Author as of October 2011 from NRC statistics (2011) Furthermore, critics of the hypothesis state that there is in particular, a misguided notion of exactly what the loan guarantee system entails (CVC). There is a view that this is a Federal subsidy. However, it is a subsidy for which the industry is paying itself. Among those who are entitled to the loan guarantee system within the clean energy sector (carbon dioxide free emitting sources) it is only the nuclear energy sector that project sponsors must pay a subsidy cost. This latter cost is the estimated average by the government of their future cost from defaulted loans in the loan guarantee system. This can have an impact on the viability of a project if it is too high as it adds another significant cost to the overall project cost -for example, if the rate was 10 percent or indeed if it was the 11.8 percent ($880million) quoted to Constellation Energy 11 for the Calvert Cliff project (Wallace, 2010) . Arguably therefore it is not the subsidy that others argue (CVP). In addition, the nuclear industry, as of yet, is unable to secure what the subsidy cost will be (6 years after the introduction of the legislation).
The Price-Anderson Act however, was renewed for a further 20 years by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. This Act does however seem to benefit nuclear energy and in particular in the light of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. Oil companies under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 are only liable for $75million yet BP were obliged to make available $20billion and pay their own costs associated with the disaster (estimated to be near $3billion) (NC, 2011). Risk and the financial amount stated in the Price-Anderson Act may need to be re-examined in this light, however, this is an area of future research given that all financial data from the BP Horizon spill are not yet available for a full examination -only around 25% of the spill response fund has been claimed to-date (NC, 2011). Nevertheless, the question arises would the Price-Anderson Act would be enforced were there a nuclear accident? Based on the BP Deepwater orizon oil spill it is unlikely that this would be the case and hence, is an area requiring urther examnation.
H f
The Improvement of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The NRC has improved as an institution over the 1990-2010 period since its previous existence in the 1960s and 1970s (H-1). The NRC was conceptualised as an independent regulatory agency which replaced the AEC in 1974. The late 1970s and 1980s was a very tough period for nuclear energy in the US due to the oil crisis, and a financial crisis, and was also subject to a period of continuous regulatory change (2B, 2C). The NRC in the late 1980s aimed to address the concerns regarding and the lessons learned from the licensing of the 104 plants that were operating in the US. This involved the revision f the entire system and the introduction of a new one -the Combined Operating and icensi o L ng system (COL) [see Bredimas and Nuttall (2008) ]. This new licensing system was designed to minimise delays in the process of awarding licenses, and also aims to standardise design applications.
It must be stated, however that the NRC was improving from a poor performance level and there remains a need for further improvement (CVC). Prior poor performance can be attributed to the NRC having just been established as a new agency and it facing the severe problem of the Three Mile Island accident almost immediately thereafter FNI-5, FNI-6). However, despite no nuclear new build having been approved by the RC un ( N der the new COL system, they have been active through the 1990s and 2000s. They have approved power upgrades license renewals for many of the 104 reactors as shown earlier in Table 2 .
There is however, recognition by the majority of respondents that the NRC can continue to improve and needs to do so if more projects are to begin (CVC). Improvements according to those interviewed centred on three core areas: that the NRC needs to (1) become more predictable; (2) decrease the length of the licensing process; and (3) become more adaptable to change (CVC). For example, the NRC has to play a more active role in ensuring safety, and to address concerns which may arise from uclear problems at other reactor sites across the world (CVC). Hence, there remains he need for further change at the NRC.
n t
Policy Inaction
Federal laws have over time become less effective in the nuclear energy sector, and this highlights the three issues analysed here. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and its imp ementation need to be re-examined, and the NRC regulatory process needs to improve and have a faster approval process. l and radioactive waste management when considering the UK nuclear energy According to Nuttall (2005) a wicked problem means that:
"As each solution is proposed it exposes new aspects of the problem. Wicked problems are not amenable to the conventional linear approaches to solving complex problems. Such linear approaches go from gathering the necessary data, through analysing the At a Federal level, this policy inaction is also evident in nuclear waste management policy which remains unresolved (H-3). There is widespread agreement that one of the major obstacles to a nuclear revival is the management and storage of spent nuclear reactor fuel and other high level radioactive waste (2A, 4A, 4E, 4F , 5B). According to the literature, the nuclear industry has concentrated on and solved many of its problems, however, it has not resolved this one. Indeed, the conclusions of Weinberg (1972) , former Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, still resonate today. He stated that a problem for nuclear energy is social institutions. Nuclear energy in comparison to other energy sources offered clean energy, however, it has a waste isposal issue that requires the best expertise to be involved in nuclear energy and that ocial i d s nstitutions responsible for nuclear do not have the longevity of existence (or in perception of existence) to help protect the public (Weinberg, 1972 ).
The US Federal government assumed the responsibility to deal with the disposal of high level radioactive waste. This was due to take the form of a long-term deep underground geological depository storage facility and its location was to be in the Yucca Mountain in Nevada. However, no state welcomed the idea of being a nuclear waste ground (CVP), despite the existence of a small high level nuclear waste facility in New Mexico for the military (Moore, 2011) . Indeed, Moore (2011) calls for states to take an increased role in the nuclear waste issue due to Federal indecision on the matter. Public opposition is high in Nevada, though a fraction of the population in Nevada were in favour of it for the economic benefit of having the facility in their state. The Senator Harry Reid (Nevada), as Senate leader was responsible for ensuring that the vote never came before the Senate, as an election loomed and a new Senate would be formed (5B).
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982 initially scheduled that a first repository site would be chosen by March 1987, with a second by March 1990. However, neither requirements were met, but by 1989 Yucca Mountain had emerged has the choice. The 1987 Amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) did however specifically state that the waste management program would be at Yucca Mountain. Nevertheless it was not until 2008 that a license application was submitted to the NRC (NRC, 2008) before been withdrawn in 2010. Nevertheless, the US Federal government have been slow to examine alternatives sites, or to resolve and fund research into alternatives, though debate on nuclear fuel recycling is growing (CVP). An example of state led action in the nuclear energy sector on the nuclear waste issue has occurred however with the development of storage of low level radioactive waste in Andrews County in Texas. This facility was give permission in April 2012, and may accept low level nuclear waste from up to 36 states (Plushick-Masti, 2011; Schecter, 2011).
The nuclear waste issue also suffers from being a "wicked problem" -this is a problem which has a circular property where the question is shaped by the solution (Conklin, 2003 in Nuttall, 2005 . Nuttall (2005) draws the connection between a wicked problem sector. data and formulating a solution towards implementation of a final agreed solution. By contrast, wicked problems can at one moment seem to be on the verge of solution, yet the next moment the problem has to be taken back to its complete fundamentals for further progress to be made. As such any opinion that the problem is almost solved is no indication that it actually is. Wicked problems can persist for decades and, for a true icked problem, no solution will ever be possible. Wicked problems typically combine l w technical factors and social factors in complex multi-attribute trade-offs. A prob em that is not wicked is said to be 'tame'. One thing is certain: in the UK, at least, radioactive waste management is not a tame problem.
It is evident that the nuclear waste issue in the US also features these wicked problem characteristics. The Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) have been given the task of suggesting solutions to the nuclear waste issue in the US and in 2011 they stated that one of the primary motivations of solving the nuclear waste issue is to restore federalstate relations which have digressed over the 20 years of court battles and indecision (BRC, 2011). Indeed, their report which does not suggest alternative sites to Yucca Mountain acknowledges that public administration of the issue needs to be rectified, and in that context they state that a new organisation, independent of the Department f Energy (DOE) needs to be established (BRC, 2011). This latter organisation will have ull res a t o f ponsibility for the US nucle r waste program. Further, i recommended that the Nuclear Waste Fund ($750 million per year) needed to be set aside in the Federal budget and treated separately so it can be used for its intended purpose (BRC, 2011).
However, there are some positives occurring at the Federal level that may benefit nuclear energy and that are surmounting the policy inaction there. Laws drafted at other Federal level institutions can have an effect on the nuclear industry (H-2). This was not a consideration by many of those interviewed, but it was accepted as possible (CVP). Further, in light of the unwillingness of the Senate to vote on legislation creating a carbon market or a carbon tax it may happen to an increasing effect that laws drafted at other Federal institutions have an increasing effect on the nuclear industry (4A, 4C, 4E). Already the US EPA is trying to move and regulate the polluting effects from the oil, gas, and coal industries via the Clean Air Act. The EPA asserts that it is protecting public health and the environment in targeting greenhouse gas emitting power plants -and it has power do so through a 2007 Supreme Court ruling -Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U. S. 497 (2007). There is opposition to the EPA n this regard who state that EPA action will increase electricity prices, but the mere fact hat this is happening demonstrates the potential of legislation created by other Federal nstitutions (beyond the DOE or NRC) to have an effect on the nuclear energy sector. 
5.2: Contested Hypothesis 2
Nuclear energy is an example of the failure to deliver large construction projects in the US on time and on budget
There are contrasting views surrounding this contested hypothesis. There is a belief that nuclear projects can be built on time. However, other interviewees argue that they cannot. One interviewee (2B) summarises it in saying that in such a big project there will always be surprises "I think there will be challenges on any big construction project and nuclear is a big one so I think there will be some challenges that they're gonna have to overcome... so I think on a project like Vogtle 3 and 4 (Georgia) as they get into some detail there will be some surprises". This hypothesis although, a contested hypothesis (see Chart 2) was accepted. The majority of interviewees in every respondent category were in favour of it acceptance. The principal reason for its acceptance and the perspective advanced in this research is that there has been a failure to understand the role of project manag s ement in the nuclear industry.
n=59, nElected Politicians=9, nPublic Sector=19, nPrivate Sector=9, nAcademic Researchers=15, nNGOs=7 According to the majority of interviewees, new nuclear build is one of the most complex construction projects and has proved difficult to deliver on time and on budget in the past (CVP). Project management was poor in the US during the last nuclear build phase, and remains so (FNI-8). In the last period of nuclear new build, the projects were dominated by the classical problems cited in literature that lead to the failure of projects to deliver on time and on budget (see Table 7 ). Further, conditions have not improved yet in the US to successfully deliver a nuclear new build project on time and on budget (4B). These problems identified by Flyvberg (2011) are not unique to the nuclear sector, however, nuclear energy projects seem to feature the majority of them. Indeed, Flyvberg (2011) states that the majority, nearly nine out of ten major projects are not uilt on time or on budget. b Proponents of the hypothesis state that not a lot has changed since the last period when nuclear new build projects began construction (CVP), and this does not augur well for new projects. For example, public administration has not improved in terms of delivering a coherent long term energy policy (CVP). Decision-making processes in the nuclear sector which involve multi-level actor groups are still not made in a unified approach. For example, nuclear energy is cited as being one of the solutions in the battle against climate change, and also for US energy security and US energy independence, yet, this is not supported at an administrative level to date. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 which incentivised nuclear new build, and was responsible for 18 applications for nuclear new build projects has been slow in its implementation as stated earlier. A major constant remains in the system in that mechanisms to deliver on policy e i in the form of outcom s rema n a weakness of the US public administration system (CVP).
The NRC having been viewed as a contributor to the time delays and cost overruns in the last nuclear new built projects has aimed to standardise the design process for new projects (
CVP). As one interviewee (2D) stated "Cost overruns were just enormous and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy, they would have one formula to do criteria that you needed to meet and you'd meet it, and they'd change their mind and you had to go in and tear it out and start over again. Real expensive".
However, since then it has implemented a new licensing process in order to decrease the length of time it takes to go through the licensing process and provide more certainty in the process to potential operators. However, no one company has tested the regime, and the Southern Nuclear project in Georgia will be the first to do so, hence delays can be expected there. These delays should not deter the nuclear industry as the new legal process R l e e es of the N C wi l ne d to be modifi d, and these modifications will only benefit future applicants (CVP).
Conditions have not improved yet in the US to deliver a nuclear new build project on time and on budget (4B). Prospective nuclear new build projects face too much uncertainty in attempting to deliver projects on time and on budget (CVP). This problem will have to be rectified to increase the number of projects in the immediate future and requires more acting in unison by actors in the nuclear sector (CVP). Public administration at a Federal level needs to improve as in essence they have the responsibility to ensure that uncertainty in the nuclear sector is reduced, not increased by their involvement (CVP). The example of the Georgia new nuclear project demonstrates that, despite the success so far in the management of the Southern Nuclear project in Georgia -scheduled to be awarded its licence (COL) so that it can begin construction in 2012 -they have been accused of going over budget and of being non-transparent about the issue by the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy environmental group (5G). Hence, project management issues remain, but as Flyvberg (2011) stated, it is imperative that complexity and unplanned events have been accounted for in the project time schedule and financial budget. For the nuclear industry in the US, the Georgia project will have a significant effect on future nuclear new build CVP). The unattractive economics of nuclear energy are the major reason the US nuclear industry has slowed down There are contrasting viewpoints on why the nuclear renaissance has not occurred in the US. The unattractive economics of nuclear energy was cited by many of the interviewees as the main reason for the stalled level of nuclear new build projects in the US. The large upfront capital cost of a nuclear project increases the investment risk deeming a nuclear project as unattractive economically. However, the evidence points away from the economics of nuclear energy as the main reason of why the nuclear renaissance has not happened in the US, and therefore this hypothesis is rejected with a slim majority of the interviewees being critics of the hypothesis (see Chart 3). In essence, economic risk attached with such large upfront investments is not the majority issue but just one reason of many in why the nuclear industry in the US has slowed down.
n=59, nElected Politicians=9, nPublic Sector=19, nPrivate Sector=9, nAcademic Researchers=15, nNGOs=7
The cost-effectiveness (or economics) of nuclear energy have made building nuclear new build unattractive, however, there are a variety of other important reasons as to why new nuclear projects have stalled. In particular, these centre on the lack of improvement made to the public administrative system regarding nuclear energy in the S. Indeed, the problems due to the latter issues result in uncertainty surrounding the ontinued growth of the nuclear sector. This uncertainty in the nuclear sector deters ew investment. 18 n e statute where tate and local feedback is sought prior to final amendment of statutes (Zimmerman, 1990; Kincaid, 1990 ).
The majority of energy policies emanating from Federal institutions that are implemented are short term in nature so as to have a limited effect on electricity prices (4A, 4E, 4F , 5B). However, electricity policy does suffer from fragmentation with each state having significant control of their own electricity policy -except for those in
Lack of Public Administration Improvement at Federal Level
Nuclear energy has also suffered due to a lack of improvements made to the public administrative system at a federal level in the nuclear sector. As one interviewee (4E) states "I think the big hurdles for nuclear are all technology and capital risk subsidies that .... have to come from the Federal government...and you have to get a NRC permit and that is a pain in the neck and takes a long time...so it is mostly Federal issue for nuclear". Nuclear power has received no support from the US government through climate change and environmental incentive mechanisms. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 supported nuclear energy development through incentives but, Federal institutions have been slow to deliver these as demonstrated earlier. There is no united action among Federal institutions and indeed some interviewees point towards too much bureaucracy and the failure of public administration in the US (2B, 4A, 4B) . Critics of the hypothesis -that the unattractive economics of nuclear energy are the major reason the US nuclear industry has slowed down -also state that with the current political tensions between Republicans and Democrats in the Senate mean that no Federal institutions want to implement new policies or changes (CVC). Further, inaction on a carbon market or carb n tax has failed to give nuclear energy a cost advantage regarding its non-CO2 produc s a o ing electricity production. The status quo of favouring the oil, ga and co l industries remain for fear of hurting the US economy (CVC).
It is difficult however, for the Federal institutions to operate as there is a question surrounding state rights. Where there are no rights or legislation explicitly given to the Federal system then the issue in question will reside under the jurisdiction of the state [i.e. because of the supremacy clause Article VI Clause 2 of the US Constitution]. This has been documented in the literature and in particular in relation to the energy sector. Timney (2002) highlights the problem in the electricity sector where a lack of federal regulation let speculators cause the California energy crisis. As a result states had to become more proactive in the management of their energy sector or be susceptible to the lack of Federal governance (Timney, 2002) . Further, Kincaid and Cole (2005) in a public survey on state and US Federal issues assert that there will be public support for national initiatives but enthusiasm for federal programmes quickly recedes -they demonstrate this by using the 2011 terrorist attacks as an example. Hence, some critics of the hypothesis argued that too much expectation is placed at a Federal level for implementing new policy (CVC). They state similar to Lutz (1992) that the Federal system in the US will guarantee a floor of rights and that development in rights for the individual will arise where states enter into competition with each other. If a similar scenario is said to be in existence in the US, it places more responsibility on the state rather than the federal system in relation to finding a solution. Indeed, an individual state should be the innovator regarding new policy and legislation. However, there is an ngoing sway of power between the state and the federal system aided by the premptiv s o e from a piecemeal or ragmented approach, i.e. where a decis on is made regarding a particular part of nuclear energy policy or regula ion (2B). President Obama is a particular public advocate of the need to maintain expertise in nuclear energy. (February 17 th , 2010) . In any country beset by the recent financial crisis (the subprime crisis 2007-2010), the issue of employment is of importance to the economy as the employment rates increase. The nuclear energy sector is an important employer and has a highly educated workforce, and this should be maintained (CVC). The above problems concerning the need for expertise of regional electricity markets, for example PJM. It is rather difficult therefore at a Federal level to impact upon state policy, as there will most likely be significant opposition by politicians to any Federal policies that will push energy prices in their state. Hence, most action at Federal level is taken in the form of financial incentives or environmental and safety legislation but all this has been limited as has been stated earlier. Any action that does transpire on these latter issues tends to be reduced in remit by the powerful lobby groups of which the nuclear lobby is not one, hence action at a Federal level that results in positive outcomes for nuclear are rare (4A, 5B). For example, the 2005 Act stated that energy security (energy independence) was a key goal in US energy policy and nuclear was to assist in these goals. However, support for this policy has not materialised to any egree at Federal level, and the nuclear industry has been left to the private sector with slow d a implementation process for any of the incentive schemes established in the 2005 Act.
It follows from the above that nuclear energy issues are under-represented at a Federal level. During the wave of nuclear expansion in the 1960s and 1970s the development of a national nuclear lobby group received little attention. As a result national lobby groups, lobby formations and networks do not as readily exist or are at an earlier stage of development than lobby groups, networks and associations for other energy sources -the Nuclear Energy Institute was only established in 1994. The NRC has the most significant role in the US nuclear energy sector. The Department of Energy also still plays a role with the Office of Nuclear Energy at the forefront however, notably the Blue Ribbon Commission (2011) suggest the establishment of a new independent institution to deal with the long-term radioactive waste issue. The Blue Ribbon Commi sion was a new institution established in 2010 and consists of 15 members who were giv s en responsibility to produce a report on the backend of the nuclear fuel cycle in the US.
Linked intrinsically to this issue is the problem of education on and surrounding nuclear energy issues. Nuclear energy is a complex subject and topic -there is an educational gap surrounding the subject area (CVC). Indeed many employees across energy and nuclear energy institutions not to mention the public, do not understand all the issues involved (2B, 4A, 5B). There is a shortage of current and prospective employees who can envisage the holistic picture of nuclear energy, and as a result decision-making from organisations in the nuclear energy decision-making sectors lack holistic decision-making ability; therefore decision-making on nuclear energy matters suffers f i t expertise has long been recognised in nuclear law and risk literature (Breyer, 1978; asper on et al. 1980; Yellin 1981; Nelkin, 1995; Palfreman, 2006) , and more recently n the Blue Ribbon Commission (2011) report on the future of nuclear energy in the US.
K i s
6: Conclusion
This paper has examined from a policy perspective Federal and State policy in the nuclear energy sector in the US from 1990 to 2010, with a particular focus on nuclear new build policy and questions whether it is or has become a Federal or State responsibility. 11 research hypotheses were developed and tested during an interview process urther inwith key stakeholders in the sector however only three qualified for f depth analysis.
The Uncontested Hypotheses however, are conclusions in themselves. There was consensus that there is too much competition by other energy sources to enable widespread nuclear energy expansion in many US states at present. There are other factors which have played a role in nuclear energy development in the US, in particular, the long regulatory regime which contributed to slow construction times, different technical designs in different states, and a weak nuclear lobby. However, the latter has seen some positive change and environmental lobbying groups even no longer see uclear energy as the primary opposition. There however, remains a problem with nform n i ation dissemination to the public regarding nuclear energy and this corresponds with a similar gap in knowledge and skills development in the educational sector.
The Contested Hypotheses revealed that that there are public misconceptions or at the very least incorrect interpretations of public administration, and project management, and legal structure issues that exist for the planning of large nfrastructure in the US have been identified. It has also been shown that there are cases f Fede i o ral policy inaction, and that consequently state policy can be a key driver in encouraging the growth and operation of the nuclear industry.
First, the strength of Federal law towards the nuclear energy sector was assessed. In general it was determined there was policy inaction towards nuclear power at Federal level. An example of this inaction is evident in the weak application of the law such as the Energy Policy Act of 2005 which had as its remit to re-ignite the industry, but has so far failed to have a significant influence or even to be applied to a significant degree for nuclear energy. In addition to this, while the regulatory body for the sector, the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) has improved as an institution, it has achieved this improvement from a very low base. Consequently, there is the example of one state (Georgia) intervening in the sector and introducing its own law to provide more certainty to the nuclear sector by the introduction of the Bill 31 which enacted the "Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act" in 2009 (see Heffron, 2012b for more analysis on this). This permits the state utility, Georgia Power, to recover costs of construction from the beginning of the construction phase -these are known as Construction Work In Progress (CWIP) payments. Further, many of those interviewees expressed surprise about the progress of the project and that the project was near to being awarded the combined licence (COL) despite the inaction at Federal towards nuclear.
Second, in the last period of nuclear new build, the projects were dominated by the failure of projects to deliver on time and on budget. In the US, there remains a misunderstanding of the issue of project management for complex construction projects, and it is highly arguable whether many of these issues have been resolved. There remains some level of discord between many of the actor groups in the nuclear energy sector, as evidence by delays in the regulatory process, and actions being taken by environmental groups. Yet, it should be noted that the nuclear project in Georgia will be a test case for the regulatory process of the NRC and for many other factors in how to bring a nuclear project into operation in the US.
The final key issue discussed concerns the view that the economics, in essence, the cost effectiveness and investment risk of a nuclear energy project is the major reason that has made building nuclear new build unattractive. The majority of those interviewed for this research oppose this latter view that economics of nuclear energy are the majority reason and argues that there are a variety of other important reasons as to why new nuclear projects have stalled. In particular, this centres on the lack of improvement made to the public administrative system regarding nuclear energy in the US. Indeed, the problems due to the latter issues result in major uncertainty surrounding the continued growth of the nuclear sector. This uncertainty in the nuclear sector deters new investment. However, the planned nuclear power project in Georgia demonstrates that a nuclear project can happen despite the negative attitudes that emanates from the investment risk that is attached to nuclear energy projects. President Obama's initial positive statements concerning growth in the nuclear sector have been re-buffed and negated. Public administrators have a role to play in the electricity sector and as the Georgia case demonstrates state level action where there is widespread Federal policy inaction can be highly effective.
It is not a stated aim of this research to consider the effects of the incident at Fukushima on the nuclear sector, as many will not materialise or become evident for some time. Nevertheless, there is an increased emphasis on safety since Fukushima, and this may lengthen the regulatory approval times to a degree of future reactor designs that need to go through the approval process. However, the Westinghouse AP1000 has had the benefit of being in the process for some time and, the NRC has finally approved the two reactors at Plant Vogtle in Georgia (February, 2012), and a further two at the Virgil C. Summer plant in South Carolina (March 2012). These projects can now proceed with construction. By co-incidence the earlier mentioned and also similar upfront capital intensive low carbon emitting energy projects such as the offshore wind project (Cape Wind) and the coal CCS project (FutureGen) which faced similar problems to nuclear new build projects, will also begin construction in 2012. The capability of Federal policy through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to deliver on its intentions has taken time. Consequently, the state has assumed the responsibility for encouraging nuclear new build. And as this research suggests there is a need for further reform in the administrative and organisational capacity of the public administration system to ensure that future legislation is more responsive in meeting its purpose and objectives within a faster time period. Time delays for large infrastructure projects increase costs and have an important role in the project management process, which this research highlights needs to improve also for the continued development of these capital intensive large energy infrastructure projects. A cross case comparison of the three
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latter projects in nuclear energy, coal and wind will provide interesting opportunities for future research in the area. 
